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The connections between the development of creative indus-
tries and the growth of cities was noted by several sources in the
first decade of the twenty-first century, but explanations relating10
to the nature of the link have thus far proven to be insufficient.
The two dominant “scripts” were those of “creative clusters” and
“creative/cities/creative class” theories, but both have proven to be
insufficient, not least because they privilege amenities-led, supply-
driven accounts of urban development that fail to adequately sit-15
uate cities in wider global circuits of culture and economic pro-
duction. The author proposes that the emergent field of cultural
economic geography provides some insights that redress these la-
cunae, particularly in the possibilities for an original synthesis of
cultural and economic geography, cultural studies, and new strands20
of economic theory.
Keywords cities, clusters, creative class, creative industries, cultural
economic geography, cultural studies, urban development
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND CITIES:
A DOMINANT MOTIF OF THE25
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The first decade of the twenty-first century were marked
by a resurgence of interest in creativity and cities. If the
rapid global proliferation of the Internet and digital me-
dia technologies in the 1990s had set off enthusiasm for30
a postindustrial “new economy,” 2000–2010 saw an en-
ergetic search by artists, entrepreneurs, investors, policy-
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makers, journalists, and many others for the wellsprings of
creativity. Creativity was seen as the foundation of inno-
vation, and innovation was seen as the new primary driver 35
of economic growth. An exemplary “new economy” busi-
ness of the 1990s was Microsoft, whose ratio of tangible
assets to market value was tiny compared to the behemoths
of the industrial age such as General Motors and Boeing.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Microsoft 40
was itself increasingly seen as too rigid in its approach
to software development, and as inhibiting the free play
of creativity. The attention instead turned to the social
media businesses that barely existed in the 1990s, such
as Google, YouTube, and Facebook, which grew not by 45
making established products, services, and processes bet-
ter, but by developing entirely new ways of doing things,
or completely new things to do, like participating in online
social networks rather than reading newspapers, or view-
ing amateur videos online rather than watching television. 50
At the core of all of this was human creativity, described
by creative economy guru Richard Florida as the most
elusive resource:
Creativity has come to be the most highly prized commodity
in our economy—and yet it is not a “commodity.” Creativ- 55
ity comes from people. And while people can be hired and
fired, their creative capacity cannot be bought or sold, or
turned on or off at will. . . . Creativity must be motivated and
nurtured in a multitude of ways, by employers, by people
themselves and by the communities where they locate. Small 60
wonder that we find the creative ethos bleeding out from the
sphere of work to infuse every corner of our lives. (Florida
2002, 5)
Renewed interest in creativity has coincided with what
Allen Scott (2008) refers to as the resurgence of cities. 65
Whereas much of the talk of the 1970s and 1980s was
of the crisis of cities, faced with the shift of manufac-
turing to lower wage economies and the decline of the
1
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innercity, and the 1990s saw prophecies that the Inter-
net heralded the “death of distance” (Cairncross 1998),70
what has become apparent is that globalization, the rise
of digital media networks and industries, and the need to
develop postindustrial urban development strategies have
all contributed to cities becoming “motors of the global
economy” (Scott et al. 2001). Over the decades the trends75
in global population distribution were also moving in this
direction. In 1950 less than 30 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation lived in cities in 1950. In the 2000s the percentage
of the world’s population living in cities (at least 3 billion
people) exceeded those living in rural areas for the first80
time in human history (Worldwatch Institute 2007).
What was notable was the symbiotic relationship that
was widely seen to exist between creative industries and
cities. Spatial agglomeration, or clustering, was seen en-
hancing innovation and flexibility by promoting infor-85
mation flows, networks of interaction, and relational ties
among a diverse but spatially proximate range of partic-
ipants and institutions, especially in industries character-
ized by high levels of uncertainty, instability, and complex-
ity (Scott et al. 2001). The British economist Alfred Mar-90
shall more than a century ago had noted the positive exter-
nalities that can arise from a clustering of related firms and
industries in a particular location (Marshall 1890/1990).
But the case of creative industries differed in that they are
driven by the externalities that arise not only from spe-95
cialization in particular industries and occupations, but
also from the positive externalities that arise from the
diversity of cities themselves (Lorenzen and Frederiksen
2008). With their diversity of industries, forms, workforce,
and skills, as well as cultural diversity, cities can be cen-100
ters for coordination among diverse knowledge bases, and
their geographical proximity promotes knowledge flows,
the spread of ideas, and new forms of entrepreneurship.
As much work in the creative industries is project-based,
contractual, and time-dependent (Caves 2000), advantages105
exist for small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) and work-
ers in the creative sectors in clustering in locations where
work emerges on a regular basis, and this in turn means that
cities act as “talent magnets” for skilled people from other
parts of the country and the world. There is also a positive110
correlation between cities being the centers of financial
and professional services and the arts and entertainment
industries, both because cultural services are most easily
accessed from these centers, and because they typically
have high average levels of consumption of cultural goods115
and services.
Cities also tend to be the centers of what Landry (2000)
termed the “hard infrastructure” of creative industries, as
they are typically where the head offices of the major
industry players are located (especially in media-related120
sectors) and where governments have typically invested
heavily in the cultural infrastructure of cities, with their
extensive network of galleries, museums, libraries, uni-
versities, and the like. This can in turn act as a catalyst
for the formation of “soft infrastructure,” or the relational 125
assets associated with economically successful networks,
such as trust, reciprocity, exchange of tacit knowledge, and
propensity to share and pool economic risk (Amin 2003).
They have also been, historically, the centers of culture.
Peter Hall (1998, 7) observed that because the city “contin- 130
ues to attract the talented and the ambitious . . . it remains
a unique crucible of creativity,” and, through his historical
account of great cities, he argued that “while no one kind
of city, or any one size of city, has a monopoly on creativ-
ity or the good life . . . the biggest and most cosmopolitan 135
cities, for all their evident disadvantages and obvious prob-
lems, have throughout history been the places that ignited
the sacred flame of human intelligence and the human
imagination.”
THE CLUSTER SCRIPT 140
The first framework that was used to understand the
relationship between creative industries and cities was
that of clusters. As noted earlier, an interest in clusters
among economists and geographers can be dated back
to Marshall’s work of on industrial districts in the late 145
nineteenth century, although the concept has had an un-
even history, perhaps because—at least for economists—it
challenges the equilibrium modeling of neoclassical the-
ories by pointing to the prospect of “winner takes all”
outcomes. In the 1990s, the cluster concept experienced 150
a resurgence through the work of business management
theorist Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School.
In extending his competitive advantage model from firms
to nations, Porter argued that the dynamic and sustainable
sources of competitive advantage derived less from lower 155
costs and production efficiencies than from elements that
promote productivity growth and innovation over time. In
particular, and following Marshall, Porter was interested
in the spillover benefits that can emerge from being in
particular locations, which have related and supporting 160
industries.
Porter argued that clusters are able provide three Q1
sources of competitive advantage to the firms that are a
part of them:
1. Productivity gains, deriving from access to specialist 165
inputs and skilled labor, access to specialized infor-
mation and industry knowledge, the development
of complementary relationships among firms and
industries, and the role played by universities and
training institutions in enabling knowledge transfer; 170
2. Innovation opportunities, derived from proximity
to buyers and suppliers, sustained interaction with
others in the industry, and pressures to innovate in
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circumstances where cost factors facing competitors
are broadly similar; and175
3. New business formation, arising from access to in-
formation about opportunities, better access to re-
sources required by business startups (e.g., venture
capitalists, skilled workforce), and reduced barri-
ers to exit from existing businesses as takeovers180
and mergers are more readily facilitated due to ge-
ographical proximity between large and small firms
in the industry.
The notion of creative clusters lends itself well to
strategies of culture-led urban regeneration that have185
been a feature of postindustrial cities in Europe in par-
ticular, stimulated by the European Union through ini-
tiatives such as the European City of Culture program
(Mommaas 2008). Cluster development had a strong ap-
peal to urban policymakers, and this was consistent with190
subnational levels of government increasingly becoming
engaged in cultural policy in an era of economic glob-
alization (Schuster 2002). As the creative cities litera-
ture has often been characterized as being “heavily reliant
on proxies but light on theory or hard evidence” (Evans195
2009, 1005), cluster theory generated no shortage of in-
ternational exemplars, such as the Hollywood film and
television cluster, the high-technology cluster of “Silicon
Valley,” the design and advertising clusters of London,
and the fashion districts of Paris and Milan. It also seemed200
to generate a strong momentum in countries where a col-
lectivist ethos has long been cultivated by governments,
such as Singapore and (especially) China, as the ways
in which “in the cluster literature, social networks, tacit
knowledge and trust relationships are valorised” (Kong205
2009, 70) are consistent with state ideologies that pro-
mote working together around shared problems and com-
mon goals, in contrast to Western liberal individualism
(Keane 2009).
The motivations behind creative cluster development210
were mixed, ranging from city branding strategies to build-
ing new forms of cultural infrastructure, cultural diversity,
and heterogeneity to redevelopment of derelict industrial-
era sites, such as warehouses and power stations for postin-
dustrial uses such as residential apartments, arts centers,215
and business incubators (Mommaas 2009). Given such an
eclectic range of motivations, it is not surprising that the
scorecard for these new “creative” urban cultural poli-
cies is also mixed (Bassett et al. 2005). Some of the
benefits have included a greater centrality of culture in220
urban development strategies; a broader and more inclu-
sive understanding of culture than simply the “high arts”;
greater recognition of lifestyle factors and consumption
activities in urban planning; and the development of new
cultural infrastructures that have renovated the image of225
cities and acted as attractors of tourism and—perhaps
more contentiously—investment. Problems with creative
cluster policies have included a blurring of the distinctive-
ness of arts and culture into entertainment, leisure, and
service industries; possibly contradictory policy agendas 230
between economic development and social inclusion; in-
stances of “capture” of the urban renewal agenda by pri-
vate real estate interests; and the possibility that the drive
to develop distinctive creative clusters has the paradoxical
effect of promoting greater urban homogeneity. The latter 235
is what Kate Oakley referred to as a “cookie-cutter” ap-
proach to developing the creative industries, characterized
by “a university, some incubators, and a ‘creative hub,’
with or without a cafe´, galleries and fancy shops” (Oakley
2004, 73). 240
Some of the problems arise squarely from the cluster
concept itself, and the ways that the concept has developed
in such a loose and all-inclusive manner that, as Ronald
Martin and P. Sunley (2003, 31) observed, “it is impossi- Q2
ble to support or reject clusters definitively with empirical 245
evidence, as there are so many ambiguities, identification
problems, exceptions and extraneous factors.” One basic
problem is a conflation between geographical and indus-
trial definitions of a cluster, so that there is a failure to dis-
tinguish between clusters where a number of firms in the 250
same industry have colocated (horizontal clusters), such
as the successful wine industries of northern California
in the United States and the Barossa Valley in Australia,
and those where a value chain of buyers and suppliers has
emerged (vertical clusters), such as the information and 255
communications technology (ICT) and electronics hub of
Silicon Valley. While both types of cluster enable knowl-
edge transfer to occur, they do so in quite different ways,
and this is blurred by the concept of creative clusters be-
ing associated with a highly diverse and in many ways 260
disconnected set of “creative industries.”
Moreover, agglomeration is not in itself evidence of
clustering in the manner that Porter refers to it. Ian Gordon
and Philip McCann (2001) distinguished between what
they referred to as simple agglomeration, in which colo- 265
cation in particular areas reduces overall costs (e.g., trans-
port and catering businesses clustering around an airport),
and those where it is social networks and embedded ties
that are critical to locational decisions: It would only be
in the latter case where clustering would be strongly con- 270
nected to innovation through knowledge flows. Finally,
it remains unclear whether particular cities develop suc-
cessful creative clusters because they are global cities,
(e.g., London, New York, and Paris) and whether what
Stevenson (2002) terms the “civic gold rush” to build cre- 275
ative clusters in the hope of attracting major creative in-
dustries firms away from these global centers is somewhat
delusional in the face of powerful forces promoting ag-
glomeration and sustained competitive advantage in the
established urban spaces. 280
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THE CREATIVITY SCRIPT
If clustering was one of the more common explanations for
the tendency toward the agglomeration of creative indus-
tries in urban centers, the other was linked to the concept
of creativity. As previously noted, the work of Florida285
(2002, 2008) was central to this, as it inverted the stan-
dard script on urban economic development that pointed
to the need for subsidies and tax breaks to entice large
employers. Florida instead argued that the growth poten-
tial of cities derived from their attractiveness to creative290
people or what he called the creative class. This argument
generated a strong groundswell of interest among urban
planners and policymakers (Peck 2005), and resonated
with the push to develop creative cities associated with
consultancy groups such as Comedia in Britain (Landry295
2000), the European Cities of Culture initiatives, and the
redevelopment of cities such as Dublin and Barcelona.
Florida’s work owed a considerable debt to earlier theo-
rists of the city, such as Jane Jacobs, who saw creativity
in cities arising out of the mix of proximity, diversity,300
and sociality that marked their populations, as well as the
importance of “third places” between home and work as
sites that sparked new social networks and the formation
of new forms of community (Florida 2008). Such argu-
ments paralleled the emphasis in Charles Landry’s (2000,305
133) work on the importance of creative milieux and “soft
infrastructure” in the creative industries, with the latter
defined as “the system of associative structures and social
networks, connections and human interactions, that under-
pins and encourages the flow of ideas between individuals310
and institutions.”
Florida’s analysis of the role of the creative class and the
rise of creative cities has been widely debated and hotly
disputed. For those who are skeptical of the wider claims
being made about creativity, there is the significant prob-315
lem of the lack of any clear and widely accepted measures
of creativity that go beyond the anecdotal and impression-
istic (Galloway and Dunlop 2008). Alternatively, there is
the danger that Florida has cast his net far too widely in
defining a “creative class,” and that it too easily becomes320
a proxy for most people with a higher degree. Andy Pratt
(2008) critiqued the focus of this approach for its em-
phasis on the consumption choices of the urban middle
classes, arguing that the focus instead needs to be on cul-
tural production and questions of how and why it locates in325
particular geographical areas. Jamie Peck (2005, 746) cri-
tiqued Florida’s account as a “fast policy” script for urban
policy that shows little concern for those not in occupa-
tions or life situations that give them spatial mobility, and
critiques what he terms Homo Creativus as “an atomized330
subject, apparently, with a preference for intense but shal-
low and noncommittal relationships, mostly played out in
the sphere of consumption and on the street.” This concern
that “the most creative places tend also to exhibit the most
extensive forms of socio-economic inequality” (ibid.) is 335
echoed by Storper and Scott (2009), who argued that what Q3
they term amenities-based models of urban growth (those
that focus on the supply of cultural goods and services
and how they influence urban migration patterns) not only
wrongly assume that all cities can follow a similar devel- 340
opmental trajectory, but that:
The emerging new economy in major cities has been asso-
ciated with a deepening divide between a privileged upper
stratum of professional, managerial, scientific, technical and
other highly qualified workers on the one side, and a mass of 345
low-wage workers—often immigrant and undocumented—
on the other side. The latter are not simply a minor side effect
of the new economy or an accidental adjunct to the creative
class. Rather, high-wage and low-wage workers are strongly
complementary to one another in the new economy. (ibid.,) Q4350
BEYOND CLUSTERS AND CREATIVITY: CULTURAL
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
The articles in this special issue of The Information So-
ciety aim to take discussion of the creative industries and
their impacts on urban development beyond these flawed 355
clustering and creativity scripts. They avoid faddishness
with grounded empirical work, combined with interdisci-
plinary frameworks that are flexible and adaptive to trends
in the cultural and economic. The framework of cultural
economic geography provides a valuable reference point 360
for such work, enabling links between insights from me-
dia, communications, and cultural studies with concepts
derived from areas of the social sciences such as institu-
tional economics and public policy studies.
In their overview of the rise of cultural economic ge- 365
ography, James et al. (2008) distinguished five distinct
but related factors associated with this emergent hybrid
discipline. First, they observed that the “Marxist turn” in
economic geography in the 1970s and 1980s, which had
sought to map spatial relations under capitalism to develop 370
a historical materialist geography (e.g., Harvey 1982), was
being challenged in the 1990s by the “cultural turn” asso-
ciated with poststructuralism, which sought to challenge
some implicit hierarchies of thought in the dominant forms
of critical geography (Gibson-Graham 2000). In particu- 375
lar, they questioned the discursive construction of “the
economy” in such analyses, and what it prioritized and
what it downplayed. For example, taking the category of
“labor,” is paid wage-labor more significant than domestic
labor, or is the fact of laboring more “real” than the ways 380
in which it is understood and approached in labor-market
theories, management discourses, or policy-related defini-
tions of work that impact welfare policies? Second, atten-
tion has been drawn to the particular ways in which culture
TJ005/TIS UTIS_A_456746 January 8, 2010 19:37
INTRODUCTION TO CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 5
and economy interlock, such as the relationship between385
markets and production as spatially grounded economic
practices and the lived experience of people within such
economic spaces (cf. du Gay and Pryke 2002). Third is the
cultural constitution of economic practice, and the aware-
ness that “cultural” factors can mark significant sources of390
regional differentiation, local entrepreneurship, and com-
petitive advantage in globalized economies, as seen in the
debates surrounding clusters and learning regions (Cooke
and Lazzeretti 2008), as well as considerations of the cul-
tural geography of economic production (Gertler 2003).395
Fourth, the rise of actor-network theory has been signif-
icant in focusing renewed attention on the performative
dimensions of “soft capitalism” and the ways in which it
is engaged in new business management practices (Thrift
1999, 2002). Finally, growing interest among academics400
and policymakers in the creative industries has intensified
interest in geographical location decisions surrounding
these industries, and the relationship between the attributes
of the industries (e.g., their propensity for project work and
networking, the unpredictability of demand, and the need405
for continuous novelty and innovation; Caves 2000) and
the attributes of urban environments in which they are
primarily located.
A major problem with creative cities discourse, in not-
ing that creative industries are frequently aggregated in410
major urban centers, is that it is unable to address the
question of causality. In other words, do creative indus-
tries cluster in global cities because they are global centers
of commercial activity, or do particular cities become cen-
ters of global commercial activity because of their cultural415
features and the creative attributes of their populations? It
is apparent, for instance, that the arts and entertainment
thrive in cities such as New York and London in part be-
cause they are also centers for financial and professional
services. What renders this question more than simply hy-420
pothetical is that urban policy “scripts” are derived from
the experiences of such cities as guides for urban pol-
icy practice in very different cities, even though they will
never acquire the global city status of the largest urban
agglomerations. The work on the northern Australian city425
of Darwin reported on by Chris Brennan-Horley, Susan
Luckman, Chris Gibson, and Julie Willoughby-Smith in
this collection considers the implications of looking at
creative industries and the creative workforce in a smaller
and very different type of city that is nether a global com-430
mercial hub nor a city grappling with the implications
of deindustrialization, but thst has a very distinctive set
of historical, geographical, and demographic features that
nonetheless can act as catalysts to creative industries de-
velopment, albeit in ways very different from the dominant435
interpretations.
One of the most sustained critiques of Florida’s work
is that it presumes that the “creative class” actively seeks
out innercity living, in search of cultural amenities and
“buzz.” There has been a strong counterargument, associ- 440
ated with Joel Kotkin (2007) in particular, that the renewal
of inner cities as residential areas is a less significant cul-
tural force than the “new suburbanization,” or the demand
for affordable housing of a reasonably large size, which
is driven as much by the pull factor of suburban amenity 445
as it is by the push factor of affordability. In this ac-
count, the neglect of suburbs is as much a reflection of an
imagined geography of exciting and diverse cities versus
boring and homogeneous suburbs—one with deep roots in
the history of suburbia (Clapson 2003)—as it is reflective 450
of where creative workforce actually locates. This debate
is overlaid by disputes about the empirical evidence that
Florida uses to support his “creative class” thesis, concern-
ing both whether culturally “hip” U.S. cities, such as San
Francisco and Seattle, actually have outperformed more 455
“boring” ones, such as Phoenix and Dallas–Fort Worth,
and whether differential growth rates between cities ac-
tually reflect different levels of human capital rather than
creative capital—that is, cities with more highly educated
populations are more prosperous than those with lower 460
levels of education, with cultural factors playing only a
minor role at best (Hansen et al. 2009; Mok 2009). The
article in this collection by Christy Collis, Emma Felton,
and Phil Graham reports on a study being undertaken into
creative workforce in selected Australian suburbs, which 465
suggests that the common association of creative workers
with innercity areas and the urban cultural policy impli-
cations arising from such assumptions need to be signifi-
cantly rethought.
The existence of urban policy scripts such as those sur- 470
rounding clusters and creativity that we have discussed
draws attention to the role played by what Pratt (2009)
terms policy transfer, and the role played by consultants
and policy entrepreneurs in enabling ideas and policy pre-
scriptions to travel from one context to another. Stuart 475
Cunningham and I observe in this collection how the orig-
inal conception of creative industries as developed by the
Department of Culture, Media and Sport in the United
Kingdom in the late 1990s has subsequently been taken
up in other parts of the world, and the significance of local 480
inflections on that original “master discourse.” We ques-
tion the degree to which international uptake can simply
be understood as simply entailing the international trans-
fer of British “New Labour” policy discourses, as argued
by Garnham (2005) and Ross (2007). Instead, we propose Q5485
that creative industries, and associated concepts such as
creative economy, have been tied up with a wider rethink-
ing of the enabling factors for innovation in postindustrial
economies, which engage the arts and humanities and well
as the sciences and technology sectors. While proposing 490
economic rationales for cultural investments is frequently
derided as neoliberalism by its critics, we argue that this
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term has become too all-encompassing to be of analyti-
cal value, and that it wrongly presupposes a dichotomy
between the public and private sectors, whereas we argue495
that creative industries policies by their nature necessitate
thinking about the commercial realm and the public sector
in tandem as drivers of cultural innovation.
There are also the familiar tensions that arise in the
relationship between top-down policy discourses that are500
developed at national government level and strategies as
applied at the local level. In the case of creative industries
policies, this is overlaid with the related tensions as to
whether the primary focus of policy is on the cultural de-
velopment of a city or its economic development. In their505
comprehensive account of the rise and fall of the Creative
Industries Development Service (CIDS) in Manchester
in the United Kingdom, Justin O’Connor and Xin Gu
capture the extent to which, while these can sometimes
converge, they can and often do significantly diverge. In510
particular, they argue that the “local knowledge” that CIDS
was able to draw upon in brokering a relationship between
government, creative industries, policy agencies, and local
cultural producers and entrepreneurs was weakened over
time, as narratives of economic development took priority,Q6 515
appearing to key decision makers as more tangible, more
achievable, and more urgent. In the case of Manchester,
this trajectory is traced in the turning away from local
cultural agencies, such as CIDS, toward metastrategies
developed at the national level, such as the proposed relo-520
cation of large sections of the British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (BBC) to the newly developed Salford Media City.
In an ironic illustration of how policy discourses travel
and recirculate, the arguments for developing Salford as
a “media city” revolved fundamentally around the virtues525
of developing a media cluster ex nihilo, and related op-
portunities to develop the location as a hub for “creative
class” work force.
This contribution aims to open up a dialogue between
disciplines that have kept some distance from one another.530
An obvious potential intersection these articles draw at-
tention to is that between cultural economic geography
and cultural studies. Contributors to this collection such
as Chris Gibson and Christy Collis have been furthering
such developments, with the institutional support of enti-535
ties such as the Australian Research Council Cultural Re-
search Network (Gibson 2006). The other obvious point
of intersection would be between cultural studies and eco-
nomics, although there are considerable problems with this
engagement on both sides, with neoclassical economics540
possessing an impoverished understanding of cultural dy-
namics, and cultural studies preferring to critique the car-
icatured figures of neoliberalism rather than engage with
more current trends in fields such as institutional, behav-
ioral, and evolutionary economics (Hartley 2009; Flew545
2009). There are also further research avenues to be ex-
plored: One absence from much of the literature that is
striking is the lack of discussion of the role played by
universities in cities, both as sites of knowledge transfer
and as providers of cultural infrastructure and developers 550
of creative capacity. Further work on how and why there
is spatial aggregation of creative industries in cities, and
what lessons can be derived by policymakers from such
clustering tendencies, will hopefully give more considera-
tion to educational institutions and their role in the cultural 555
economic geography of cities.
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